Aristotle’s theory of emotions

Abstract

This paper reconstruct a general picture of Aristotle’s theory of emotion developed in his major works. Most commentators express hesitation about whether it is possible to reconstruct such a theory of emotion in Aristotle’s philosophy. Though I agree with much of the concern they raise, I still believe that there exists a coherent, somehow well-grounded, theory of emotion in Aristotle’s philosophy. I argue that Aristotle’s account of emotion cannot be interpreted as a pure cognitivism, like the Stoic’s theory of emotion, or as a strong physicalism. Identifying different aspects of Aristotle’s account of emotion, I have tried to demonstrate that there is a logical and conceptual connection between these different aspects such that both cognitive and affective aspects co-exist in his theory of emotions. Section one and two provide the metaphysical and psychological bases of Aristotle’s theory of emotion. Section three is an attempt to identify the physical aspect of emotions in Aristotle, the aspect which he takes as essential to emotions. The cognitive aspect, in section four, deals with emotions in terms of beliefs, intentionality, and having the power of changing judgments. I conclude the paper with a discussion on the relationship between action and emotion in Aristotle.