HISTORICAL THEORY OF REFERENCE AND THE CRITERIA OF IDENTITY: The Clash of Kripke's and Linnebo's Theories of Reference

Abstract

In his development of an ontology for mathematics in line with Fregean abstractionism, & Oslash;ystein Linnebo proposes criteria of identity as a mechanism for reference. This proposed mechanism appears to conflict with Saul Kripke's historical theory of names. However, Linnebo, distinguishing between semantic and metasemantic domains, asserts that no real conflict exists; while Kripke's theory is semantic, his is metasemantic. This paper posits a counter-argument, contending that Linnebo's account, contrary to his claim, indeed conflicts with Kripke's historical theory of names. The paper underscores that, in Kripke's framework, the reference relation transcends the individual, inhabiting a social domain.