The Place of Aporia in Plato's Dialogues

Abstract

Philosophy stipulates a kind of pathos that gains impetus through feelings of wonder and amazement. However, it is completed with an active thinking possibility that accompanies this condition, namely logos, in addi-tion to being affected. The two situations that complement each other by in-tertwining acquire their most obvious appearance in the context of the prob-lem called aporia. In the history of philosophy, aporia is effectively used in Plato's thought. Aporia, which seems to be a growing crisis in the activity of knowing, conduces to the arise of two typical situations in dialogues, usually not knowing what one does not know and a tendency to realize that one does not know. However, aporia is appeared with a completely different meaning in dialogues. The aporia, which is the basis of this second and the first, is rep-resented by Socrates ? claim The only thing that I know is that I know not-hing. In our study, we analyse the paradigmatic elements of Plato's dialogues, in terms of various stages, on what kind of pathos-logos nexus the aporia is processed. Our aim is to show how the impasse which is the others fundamen-tal and leads to human wisdom, draws the boundaries of philosophy.